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‘LIBERATION’ OR CAPTURE: YOUTH IN BETWEEN ‘HAKUMA’ AND 
‘HOME’ DURING CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH IN SOUTHERN 
SUDAN 
 
CHERRY LEONARDI 
 
Generational tension and ‘youth crisis’ have been prominent themes in recent analyses of 
civil conflict in Africa. Field research in Southern Sudan in 2004-6 suggests that the 
analysis does not fit the Sudanese war. This article examines a structural opposition 
between the sphere of military/government (the ‘hakuma’) and the sphere of ‘home’. It 
argues that to be a ‘youth’ in Southern Sudan means to inhabit the tensions of the space 
between these spheres. While attempting to resist capture by either sphere, youth have 
used their recruitment by the military to invest in their home or family sphere. Their 
aspiration to ‘responsibility’ illustrates not generational rebellion, but the moral 
continuity in local society, also evident in discussions of marriage. 
 
This is a pre-copy-editing author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in 
African affairs following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version 
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391-412 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm037 
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TAKEN LITERALLY THE INFAMOUS SUDAN PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA) 
training slogan – ‘even my father, I will give him a bullet’1 implies that as well as 
seeking regime change or independence the Sudanese rebellion was about 
overturning generational control. This has been the assumption behind the only 
existing interpretations of SPLA recruitment. Willis, for example, drawing largely 
on previous case studies of rebel recruitment in Eastern Equatoria, attributes 
Southern Sudanese youth militarisation to ’chronic generational tensions’2  while 
Jok highlights ‘generational conflict’ as sustaining the war in Northern Bahr El 
Ghazal. This article argues that the situation is more complex than this, and that 
Jok’s additional description of Southern Sudanese youth as living ‘under conditions 
of political conflict where fighting and defending one’s family and property is a 
major preoccupation’, might be a more appropriate interpretive key.3  
 
  Family responsibility for youth recruitment into armed conflicts in Africa has 
received relatively little examination in the literature.
4
 Historical-anthropological 
explanations for youth violence and militarization tend to focus on the inherent 
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2
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3
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4
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Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger (eds), Postcolonial Identities in Africa (Zed Books, London, 
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militia solidarities and demobilisation in Sierra Leone’, in Paul Richards (ed.), No Peace No War: An 
anthropology of contemporary armed conflicts (James Currey, Oxford, 2005), p. 124. 
 3 
tensions of gerontocratic societies.
5
 Research on West-African wars meanwhile 
invokes a socio-economic ‘youth crisis’ in which a generation defined by its political 
and economic marginalization forms a discontented constituency ripe for political 
manipulation, recruitment for rebellion, and violence.
6
 This detachment from society 
and the gap between aspiration and actual opportunity have perhaps been greatest for 
urban youth, though 
7
 Richards has argued that the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
conflicts were driven more by rural malcontents.
8
 
 
  Richards’ analysis might appear to explain the violence against chiefs by SPLA 
soldiers in Southern Sudan. However, the informants for this article did not cite either 
resentment against chiefs or generational antagonisms as significant reasons for youth 
recruitment into the armed forces, or indeed as the primary concerns of “youth” 
during the war. Instead they repeatedly focused on the vulnerability of youth to 
capture by the military, and cited family roles and responsibilities as the primary 
consideration in the decisions taken by youth during the war. This article does not 
claim to offer a comprehensive explanation for military recruitment; it is based on oral 
research in three sites – Yei, Juba and Rumbek – among a range of ages and 
backgrounds, not on a survey of SPLA recruits across Southern Sudan.
9
 But it does 
question the universal applicability both of an African ‘youth crisis’, and of the 
relevance of generational tensions to the involvement of Southern Sudanese youth in 
civil wars. 
 
  Youth is a complex category in Southern Sudan. As elsewhere, it is no longer a clear 
life-stage demarcated by traditional initiations and marital/reproductive status.
10
 
Vernacular terms [aparak (Dinka), teton (Bari) and ‘bula (Kakwa)] reflect the 
historical life-stage category of unmarried men responsible for warfare and cattle-
keeping. Although this retains some relevance in the cattle camps of Rumbek, in 
                                                 
5
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(2002), pp. 181-215. 
8
 Paul Richards, ‘To fight or to farm? Agrarian dimensions of the Mano River conflicts (Liberia and 
Sierra Leone)’,  African Affairs 104, 417 (2005), pp. 571-90. 
9
 Juba remained a GoS garrison town during the war and has become the capital of the new GoSS; like 
Yei, it is in Central Equatoria State, whereas Rumbek is in Lakes State. All three towns have ethnically 
mixed populations but the indigenous inhabitants of Juba and Yei are Bari, and Bari-speaking Kakwa 
and Pojelu respectively, while Rumbek is in a cattle-keeping Agar Dinka area. Yei and Rumbek were 
finally captured by the SPLA in 1997: Øystein H. Rolandsen, Guerrilla Government: Political changes 
in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s (Nordisca Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2005), pp. 161-5. 
10
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morality and gender relations in the era of AIDS’, in Catrine Christiansen, Mats Utas and Henrik E. 
Vigh, (eds.) Navigating Youth, Generating Adulthood: Social becoming in an African context 
(Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2006), pp. 117-8, fn 1. 
 4 
general these terms have been blurred by wider definitions of ‘youth’ based on age 
(18-30, or, according to the SPLM/A youth wing, 18-45) or on political subordination 
or exclusion. Politically, and especially since the peace agreement of 2005, those who 
assert themselves as ‘youth’ do so in the belief that they would bring innovation and 
improvement in government if given the opportunity, in common with political youth 
movements elsewhere.
11
 Socially, marriage does not necessarily end the period of 
being ‘youth’; social maturity is recognized on a more individual and gradual basis as 
a person gains ‘responsibility’ within a family or community. 
 
  This article is primarily interested in the in-between role of ‘youth’. But rather than 
seeing youth as between childhood and adulthood, it sees youth as operating between 
two spheres: ‘hakuma’ and ‘home’. The opposition between these spheres is more 
crucial to understanding the violence in Southern Sudan than is the tension between 
elders and youth. Broadly, ‘government’ – ‘hakuma’ in Arabic – has come to denote a 
bundle of influences and symbols, spatially located in the town. It encompasses 
armies and the military cultures originally introduced by the Turco-Egyptian army in 
the nineteenth century, and also the literate, bureaucratic cultures of schools and 
government offices. Vernacular terms reflect this amalgamation of urban, military and 
government cultures: tueny in Dinka-speaking Rumbek, for example, can indicate 
anybody schooled, uniformed (or even clothed) or simply town-dwelling; gela (or 
miri) in Bari/Kakwa-speaking Yei and Juba were originally used to denote white 
people, but nowadays refer to the government, the military, and uniforms. Even 
though they fought against the Government of Sudan the SPLA belong in this sphere; 
they were known in Yei as ‘the gela of the bush’, and increasingly in the liberated 
areas simply as the ‘hakuma’. The frustration of young students and 
government/military employees has contributed to the instigation of rebel movements 
in Southern Sudan, but their frustration is over their marginalization or repression 
within the government sphere, rather than over their status in relation to elders. 
 
  Most people distinguish this broad ‘government’ sphere from an alternative social 
sphere, commonly expressed spatially as the bec (Dinka), jur (Bari/Kakwa) or beled 
(Arabic): the land or country outside the town. It is also defined as ‘home’ – bai 
(Dinka), bang (Bari/Kakwa) or bayt (Arabic) – and governed by the decision-making 
and dispute settlement of family heads and chiefs, which are contrasted with the ways 
of ‘hakuma’. As in Giblin’s account of a ‘private’ family sphere in Tanzania, people 
try to keep family issues private from the government or foreigners. Unlike in 
Tanzania however, the chiefs have also long played a part in keeping community 
affairs secret from the government sphere.
12
 Particularly since the 1970s, the 
distinction between spheres has become increasingly abstract as more people have 
moved into the towns, gone to school and entered government or other employment. 
The distinction is still drawn, however, because ultimately there remains a sense of 
moral difference between the values and relations of the ‘hakuma’ and of the 
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 Willis, ‘Who put the ‘Y’’, p. 92; Jean-François Bayart. The State in Africa: The politics of the belly 
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communities outside. The moral authority of the latter has been sustained to perhaps a 
surprising degree during the wars, and, it will be argued, continues to be subscribed to 
by ‘youth’. For convenience, this article will refer to these two spheres as ‘hakuma’ 
and ‘home’. 
 
  The article treats youth as a category characterised by their participation in both 
‘hakuma’ and ‘home’, but also by their resistance to full incorporation into either 
sphere. Fanthorpe suggests that youth in Sierra Leone had been falling into ‘a political 
and moral vacuum’ between the rural bloc and the patrimonial state.13 This article 
argues instead that Southern Sudanese youth were actively operating in the space 
between spheres, and that they were largely struggling to avoid capture rather than to 
overcome exclusion. As one recent collection argues, being a youth can also involve 
escaping confining structures and enjoying a period of freedom.
14
 The overwhelming 
theme in accounts of the war by those who see themselves as – or as having been – 
youth, is the danger of capture by the military forces. The article therefore initially 
examines the background to this theme of capture of youth by the ‘hakuma’, but it 
then turns to the central role of family in military recruitment and war. The moral 
authority of ‘home’ is then further explored through discussions about marriage. This 
leads on to the struggles of youth to resist capture and retain a degree of independence 
through their in-between status, especially in the aftermath of the war, but also their 
investment ultimately in the moral values and relations of ‘home’. 
 
 
Capturing the youth 
 
  The recruitment of youth into the recent civil war in Southern Sudan has fitted into a 
historical pattern of capture by ‘government’ which began with the raiding and 
capture of slaves by foreign traders and the Turco-Egyptian army in the nineteenth 
century. Johnson describes the zariba system of military camps that grew up across 
Southern Sudan in the latter half of the nineteenth century, populated by a mixture of 
foreign and local, slave and free soldiers, traders and their auxiliary staff and families. 
There is evidence of zara’ib in Rumbek and along the Nile near Juba, while Yei was 
reportedly a market centre for the slave trade. The slave-soldiers captured locally were 
often young boys, and many locals also voluntarily became ‘gun-boys’ to a soldier-
patron, attracted by clothes and guns. The zara’ib also relied on the capture of slaves 
for labour, marriage/concubinage or sale. Once captured, they would be transformed 
by life in the camps, as their allegiance shifted to new patrons with a different culture. 
The ‘Nubi’ descendants of the soldiers and slaves of the zara’ib would later inhabit 
the malakia areas of Southern towns, and remain associated with government and an 
urban commercial and Islamicized culture.
15
 
                                                 
13
 Richard Fanthorpe, ‘Neither citizen nor subject? ‘Lumpen’ agency and the legacy of native 
administration in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs 100, 400 (2001), pp. 363-386. 
14
 Christiansen, Utas and Vigh, ‘Introduction’ to their (eds.) Navigating Youth, pp. 9-28, esp. pp. 9-16; 
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15
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zara’ib in Southern Sudan’, Slavery and Abolition 13, 1 (1992), pp. 162-73 OR in Elizabeth Savage 
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  The fear that youth might be captured – whether forcibly or voluntarily – by 
military/commercial centres must have therefore entered local cultures as far back as 
the nineteenth century. Early colonial reports explained resistance to medical 
inspections or to sending children to school in terms of a general fear that children 
would be ‘eaten’ by the foreigners.16 Schools have retained an association with 
‘hakuma’ and capture: ‘My child has gone to the government’, as one woman from a 
cattle-keeping community near Juba recently described her son’s enrolment in the 
local primary school. There has long been a concern that girls in particular would be 
delayed or corrupted away from proper marriage by being in school.
17
 Of course the 
majority of primary school pupils returned to or remained in their villages having 
gained some basic literacy and a smattering of Arabic or English, though there were 
complaints in the colonial period that they had less respect for their elders.
18
 But a few 
spent years away from home studying and perhaps working, and those who sought 
fullest incorporation into the ‘hakuma’ became the Southern ‘intellectuals’ and 
‘politicians’, from the 1950s onwards. Their perceived capture is expressed in 
recurring claims that they were bribed by northern politicians and thus sucked into the 
remote locus of government in Khartoum, the ultimate antithesis of the home 
sphere.
19
 
 
  It is through school and town that a person ultimately becomes tueny (in Dinka) or 
gela (in Bari): a town/uniformed/official person. Rural communities tend to depict 
those who have undergone this transformation as practising lies and trickery for their 
own self-interest, or even as being Government spies. They are seen to be vulnerable 
to monetary bribery, having transferred their allegiance away from local social and 
kin relations, to the patronage and immoral economy of the ‘hakuma’. The most 
striking recent illustration is the reported employment of children as spies in their own 
communities by the Government of Sudan (GoS) garrison in Juba; brought to wash 
clothes and then bribed with food by the soldiers, they were apparently captured by 
the military camp like the gun boys a century earlier.
20
  
 
  From the perspective of rural communities, school and army have been connected as 
‘government’ institutions; since the 1950s, schools have often been the launch pad for 
boys to enter the military, including rebel forces. Riots by school pupils and university 
students have repeatedly played a part in the conflicts, and rebel movements have 
sought to harness (and control) their anger. It was largely students/schoolboys, 
soldiers and government employees who joined the Southern rebel camps during the 
first civil war in the 1960s and the more educated ones were sent out to villages to 
                                                                                                                                            
pp. 72-88; Mark Leopold, Inside West Nile: Violence, history and representation on an African frontier 
(James Currey, Oxford, 2005), pp. 126-7. 
16
 B. H. H. Spence to mother, Yei, 31 Dec. 1914, Shetland Archive, Lerwick D12/200/1-28. 
17
 Janson-Smith, ‘Report on Juba training school Final Examination, 1941’, National Record Office, 
Khartoum (hereafter NRO) Dakhlia 3 1/6/29. 
18
 Juba Mission Report 1942, Church Missionary Society Archive, Birmingham, G3 Sg2; Governor 
Parr to Hickson, Inspector Education, 20 March 1939, NRO Equatoria Province 1/4/17. 
19
 Beaton, ‘Report on the effects of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Southern Sudan’, 17 March 
1953, (FO 371/102753), in D. H. Johnson (ed.), British Documents on the End of Empire Project, 
Series B, Vol. 5, Sudan (Stationery Office, London, 1998), Part II, no. 302, pp. 228-33; Interview, Juba, 
15 March 2006; Interview, Yei, 3 October 2005. 
20
 Interview, Juba, 15 March 2006. 
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publicise and recruit.
21
 Many schoolboys who joined these ‘Anyanya’ forces were 
later sent to schools in Uganda. The close links between education and army 
continued, but the perceived failure of the educated politicians to unite effectively led 
to the increasing prominence of military leaders in the first civil war, and would 
justify the overall dominance of the military in the SPLA/M.
22
 The SPLA war 
effectively began in 1983 with army garrison mutinies and the movement of soldiers 
and schoolboys to Ethiopia to join the remnants of the Anyanya fighters who had 
rejected the Addis Ababa Agreement. From the perspective of those outside the 
‘hakuma’, the instigation of rebellion against the Khartoum government was thus seen 
to be rooted within the ‘hakuma’, led by those already in the military, government or 
school, who felt marginalized within that sphere, and sometimes with disapproval 
from their families or home communities, fearing the punitive consequences of such 
‘troublemaking’. Obvious anti-‘Arab’ feeling (increased by the GoS punitive 
retribution against civilians) notwithstanding, people depict the war as a ‘struggle for 
the chiefship’ between rival governments, into which their own youth were drawn 
either by direct capture or in order to defend their home.
23
  
 
  In the 1980s, SPLA propaganda encouraged thousands of young boys to walk to 
Ethiopia in the hope of going to school, but they instead found themselves in SPLA 
training camps and the infamous ‘Red Army’ of child soldiers, as did others fleeing 
towards Kenya or Uganda in the 1990s. Those labelled as ‘orphans’ or 
‘unaccompanied minors’ – whether or not they were truly unaccompanied by family 
members – were the most vulnerable to military capture, detached as they were from 
the ties of family; it is the Red Army soldiers whom Jok labels as the ‘lost generation’ 
of Southern Sudan.
24
 Meanwhile the Khartoum government forced secondary school 
leavers and students into military training and service. In the GoS-controlled garrison 
town of Juba, one woman explained that her son was conscripted into the GoS army 
because ‘he went to school’. Another mother in Rumbek with the same explanation 
suggested that the army was simply another kind of ‘education’. Both schools and 
army have thus been viewed with ambivalence as a potential route to income and 
status but also as a means of capturing youth into the ‘hakuma’. 
 
  However, the desire for education also drew many young people to leave the South, 
and the difficulty of recruiting rural youth to the rebellion meant that the SPLA 
increasingly resorted to direct forced conscription, which was particularly resented in 
Central Equatoria.
25
 The relationship with the SPLA here had always been 
problematic; perceived initially as an ethnically Dinka army with historical grudges 
                                                 
21
 The Southern rebel forces of the first period of civil war became known as the ‘Anyanya’, a Madi 
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22
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23
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 Jok, ‘War, changing ethics’, esp. pp. 145-155; Human Rights Watch, ‘Civilian devastation: Abuses 
by all parties in the war in southern Sudan’ (Human Rights Watch, New York, 1994), pp. 195-224. 
25
 See also Human Rights Watch,’ Civilian devastation’, pp. 189-94; Mkandawire, ‘The terrible toll’. 
 8 
against Equatorians, it only gained limited support through the propaganda of certain 
prominent Equatorian commanders. The forced conscription was therefore often 
represented simply as loss, ‘because their children were being taken to die’.26 Boys 
and young men who remained in the ‘bush’ around Yei recount how they had to hide 
or how they were captured, some repeatedly, escaping perhaps through the 
intervention of chiefs or church leaders. Even around Rumbek, where there had 
initially been more voluntary enlistment, the scale of deaths in the war increasingly 
became a deterrent. In the 1990s the ‘big young guys’ (as an English-speaking young 
man put it) escaped deep into the bush to hide from recruitment, and so even younger 
boys were ‘given to the Government’ [the SPLA]. In GoS-controlled Juba, young men 
had to keep a low profile because of their vulnerability: the brutal GoS security forces 
suspected them of supporting the rebels, unless they joined the GoS forces or their 
local militias, while if they ventured out of the town they might be captured by the 
SPLA.
27
 And in all areas, girls were taken, more or less forcibly, to be ‘wives’ of 
soldiers.  
 
  It is thus not the violent strength or rebellious motivation of youth that is emphasized 
in telling the story of the war, but rather their vulnerability and their efforts to hide or 
find refuge. Once captured, the process of incorporation into the military/government 
sphere began. Young conscripts were exposed to great hardship and violence even in 
the training camps. Some sought to escape from the camps, and their parents or chiefs 
were ordered to make them return; one father explained that this was impossible, for 
his son now had a gun and was already beyond the reach of parental command.
28
 The 
SPLA indoctrinated young recruits into the personality cult surrounding their leader, 
John Garang, and taught them to see the gun as their only means of support.
29
 It also 
worked on the basis of patronage, becoming the personal bodyguard of a Commander 
was the best way to avoid being sent to the front line. Commanders rewarded their 
followers, notably with girls. One woman remembers her fear when seized by an ‘old’ 
commander and her partial relief that he “gave her” to a less intimidating younger 
soldier. 
 
  So, following a historical pattern, and in common with other rebel armies, the SPLA 
used a combination of violence and patronage to transfer the allegiance of young 
soldiers from their families to the military hierarchy.
30
 The now-infamous training 
slogan, ‘Even my father, I will give him a bullet’, seemed to sum up the process, and 
fits an analysis of youth mobilization as shaped by generational tension and the search 
for alternative patronage. But it was a slogan, not necessarily a reality. The senior 
SPLA Commander who suggested to me that it was indeed a reality and that parents 
and chiefs had lost all authority over the young men, so that people are living ‘in 
disarray’ echoed the rhetoric used by the first British colonial officers to depict the 
devastating effects of nineteenth century upheavals.
31
 Such a claim gives the 
                                                 
26
 Interview, Yei, 3 October 2005. On Dinka/Equatorian divisions see Johnson, Root Causes, pp. 85-7. 
27
 See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Civilian Devastation’, pp. 123-4. 
28
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30
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Wingate’s speech at Rejaf, 1911, NRO Cairo Intelligence 10/12/53. 
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government justification to intervene in local communities to discipline ‘youth’.32 In 
fact, families and communities have been reclaiming their children and reviving – or 
maintaining – their authority. The brutal behaviour of ‘even our own boys’ is now 
often excused locally by depicting them as the victims of the violence and immorality 
of the military sphere that captured and transformed them. 
 
 
Sending the youth 
 
  Military capture has been a very real experience, and for many thousands of families 
it led to the total loss of their sons in the war. But recruitment was not simply a matter 
of capture; it was often a process influenced by families and communities as well as 
by military force. Some youth also enlisted more voluntarily in order to obtain means 
of defence for the home sphere. Ultimately, the search for alternative patronage by 
youth has been part of their investment in their home communities. An important 
aspect of being ‘youth’ has involved going out from the home to win resources 
outside; young men could bring back wealth through raiding, later through waged 
labour, and more recently through international aid. School has become more popular 
even in the cattle-keeping areas as parents have come to see it as an investment: ‘Once 
you are an educated person, you have secured the life of your own people’, one young 
man in Rumbek explained. But given the historical nature of governments in Southern 
Sudan, one of the most valuable assets to be gained in the government sphere has 
been protection. Having a son in the administration, army or police has often been 
seen as the best defence for a family. Conversely, when in the 1960s and 1980s-90s 
some policemen, teachers and other ‘government’ employees are said to have been the 
most at risk from GoS repression, their communities were forced to seek alternative 
means of defence. 
 
  While their leaders have fought wars to capture government for themselves, the 
majority of Southerners fought or supported those wars to protect the home and to 
overcome their sense of powerlessness in relation to the military.
33
 In the case of the 
first civil war, this was simpler in the sense that many Anyanya recruits fought in or 
near their home areas. Soldiers were even sent home to get bride-wealth from their 
fathers if they wanted to marry, to prevent abuses. The rebellion is said to have been 
fought to defend local customs and values against an increasingly centralizing and 
homogenizing state. Youth in the villages were also given duties as messengers and 
food collectors, but placed under the authority of their chiefs, with whom the rebels 
had generally good relations: with little outside support, the Anyanya were much 
more dependent on villagers than the SPLA.
34
 The latter – despite also at times 
making defence of local custom their principal ideology
35
 – were themselves a threat 
to homes and families. Many young men joined village militia groups to defend the 
community and its cattle or other resources against the various military forces. In 
Lakes State, the name gal weng (cattle-guards) was given to them by the chiefs and 
elders to emphasise their role of protection (as well as to bind youth to a local idea of 
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wealth as embodied in cattle). Even the young Pari men in Eastern Equatoria who 
joined the SPLA partly because of generational tensions soon returned with their 
weapons, to defend their home area.
36
 In general, people reacted bitterly to the 
intrusion of the military (both SPLA and GoS) into rural communities. One literate 
Yei chief claimed that the harassment was a deliberate SPLA policy to provoke 
people into joining them, and many young men explain how – ‘tired of running and 
fearing’ – they wanted to join an army because of being bullied by soldiers, or saw it 
as another means of defending their own community against the same army.
37
 Some 
girls married soldiers to secure protection from rape by other soldiers. Youth were 
thus entering the military sphere to remedy their sense of disempowerment, not by 
their parents or older generations, but by GoS repression and increasingly by the 
behaviour of SPLA soldiers.
38
 
 
  In fact, family relations and considerations frequently determined the patterns of 
recruitment. Young men nearly always explain whether they enlisted or not on the 
basis of family. If they were the only or the oldest son, their priority was to look after 
their parents and siblings, while those who agreed to be conscripted claim that they 
did so on behalf of their family, to spare other siblings. Even those who initially stated 
that they joined the earlier Anyanya rebels or the SPLA to ‘liberate my country’ often 
later revealed that they were ‘sent’ by their father or clan. Around Rumbek, clans met 
the SPLA demands for a certain number of conscripts by systematically recruiting 
beginning with the grandsons of the first wives of the grandfather, so that boys from 
the most junior branches of a large family group might well escape conscription. 
‘Good’ chiefs are also said to have protected families from having all their sons 
conscripted. No doubt boys with few or no relatives were the most vulnerable. The 
SPLA also manipulated family ties, by threatening to take the mother or father if none 
of their sons made themselves available. 
 
  The SPLA leadership in fact increasingly had to recognize the importance of local 
community authorities to both recruitment and the morale of the soldiers, especially in 
the early 1990s when the movement was threatened by military defeats and internal 
divisions. It gave chiefs military training and rank to try to increase their authority, as 
well as to incorporate them into its hierarchy.
39
 It also turned to spiritual leaders like 
rain chiefs and spear masters to inspire and encourage the ordinary soldiers.
40
 If youth 
could not be captured directly, alternative means of controlling them were needed, 
and so in the ‘liberated’ areas, the SPLM/A administration sought to bolster 
traditional authority and re-formalize the court structures, to manage those 
‘traumatized’ youth. Thus the big men, whose own military power and wealth (and 
distance from their home community) enable them to contravene such laws and 
authority, have been depicting themselves as restoring tradition and upholding 
customary law.  
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Becoming a ‘full person’ 
 
  The continuing moral authority of family and home community during and since the 
war is particularly apparent in the subscription of youth to an ultimate ideal of 
responsible adulthood which requires their marriage to be recognized by their families 
and communities. ‘Now I am getting married, I will be a full person’, explained one 
young man in Rumbek, reflecting the emphasis placed on traditional definitions of 
youth and adulthood in Agar Dinka society: ‘You see, up to now I was only a half-
person!’ Marriage and bride-wealth have been cited as central to generational tensions 
and a factor in military recruitment –  youth may be driven to seek patronage 
elsewhere to escape their dependency on elders and relatives for bridewealth.
41
 But 
such arguments can be too structural and economic, and ignore the real need 
expressed by Southern Sudanese youth for moral and social recognition and approval 
of their marriage, for ‘full-person’ status is still ultimately measured by the values and 
ideals of the home community. More practically, marriage is believed to need the 
counselling of relatives to sustain it later on. Marriage is a strikingly frequent topic of 
conversation, banter and debate among all ages, even in Juba, where other topics of 
discussion were silenced or driven underground by GoS surveillance and repression in 
the 1990s. In fact it is in discussion of marriage that the continuities and reproduction 
of an oral culture – and the investment in it by youth – are particularly apparent. And 
though such a culture is diffuse (hence its survival during war), it produces a sense of 
sacrosanctity and permanence. It is particularly obvious in the cattle-keeping areas 
like Rumbek, but even among those who have grown up in Uganda or who live in the 
allegedly debauched towns, there is little question that sooner or later parental, 
judicial or even divine authority will catch up with anyone who transgresses laws of 
bride-wealth and marital arrangements. Marriage itself is not always – despite the 
Rumbek youth’s assertion – an immediate rite of passage to the status of being 
‘responsible’, a common definition of mature adulthood. Even a teenager may get 
married, but will remain a youth, until he/she has gained in social responsibility and 
built up an established household, perhaps with older children. But nevertheless, 
marriage is a necessary precondition to later status as an adult, and to legitimate 
reproduction: ‘here someone who is not married could never become a minister or 
president’. 
 
  The war saw the forcible disregard of marriage norms by soldiers. Around Yei, many 
people allege that SPLA soldiers committed brutal rapes of young girls and also that 
they raped wives on top of their husbands; the emphasis on the humiliation of the 
husband suggesting that this was understood primarily as a reversal of normative 
control over sex and marriage, as were the forced ‘marriages’ of daughters or wives to 
soldiers from both sides. But since the cessation of immediate hostilities, there has 
been a gradual process of addressing the consequences, and in many cases soldiers 
have been brought to courts to pay bridewealth, or their ‘wives’ have returned to their 
home areas (although often without the children).
42
 It is hard as yet to quantify the 
judicial process, and no doubt many, especially among the commanders or Northern 
soldiers, have escaped it. But forced marriages by soldiers during the war do not 
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appear to have fundamentally overturned the ideals and norms of marriage, and 
indeed may have helped to strengthen them by provoking and uniting moral 
opposition to the use of force. 
 
  One indicator of the resilience of marriage is that bridewealth, in particular high 
bridewealth, remains a topic of paramount concern. Even older people complain that 
their children are unable to marry and blame the inflation on the increase of money 
from employment abroad.
43
 In Equatoria, the conversion of bride-wealth into cash and 
the opportunities for income-earning have long enabled some young men to pay their 
own bride-wealth. But they still remain dependent on parents and uncles to negotiate 
and bless their marriages and to contribute symbolically. One young man in Juba, 
seeking proper marriage to the mother of his four-year-old child, and with 
independent means of paying the bride-wealth, nevertheless remained outside the 
prolonged negotiations among older relatives as to whether the couple were in fact 
distantly related and thus unable to marry. He accepted this process passively; his 
potential wife was more fervently afraid of the curse of the elders or ancestors. Even 
in refugee camps in Uganda, where a universal agreement suspended the payment of 
full bride-wealth until the impoverished refugees could return to Sudan, normal 
marriage negotiation procedures are nevertheless said to have been followed. Casual 
relations and pregnancies are of course common in the towns, but the ideal of 
respectable marriage remains powerful among Equatorian youth even as they 
complain about the bride-wealth amounts which are now measured in ‘millions’ of 
Uganda Shillings or old Sudanese Pounds. 
 
  In cattle-keeping communities (Agar Dinka and Mundari), bride-wealth payments in 
cattle have remained even more sacrosanct and more dependent on family 
contributions. Young and old, town and rural people alike are horrified by the idea of 
‘free’ marriage, and insist that bride-wealth must be paid in cattle, not money. In 
Rumbek, a man’s access to a wife is dependent upon cattle contributions from 
relatives, and determined, like so much else, by his place in the lineage. Young men 
sometimes express bitterness, like one whose elder brother had already married three 
wives before he had married one. But as an unmarried 30-year-old man repeatedly 
emphasized, it is ‘impossible’ to change this system. Another young man thought that 
while casual sex and pregnancies did occur in Rumbek, it was better to pay the fine 
and compensation for impregnation than to ‘elope’ a girl and thus damage relations 
with her family. His brother interpreted a recent motorcycle accident of an eloping 
couple as an act of God: ‘if parents don’t want you to do something, you should not 
do it’. Girls assume that their parents will decide their marriage for them, and young 
and older women alike warn against the serious risk of girls causing fights by eloping 
with a man. 
 
  In all areas, girls have tended to invest in proper marriage, because it remains even 
more crucial to their status. The risk of being labelled a ‘prostitute’ is a powerful 
deterrent to casual relationships, though more change is evident in the towns as young 
women have been returning from abroad with different ideas about relationships. But 
even so, their own status is measured by the bride-wealth amounts paid, making them 
as committed to the marriage system as their parents: ‘how can I be married for less 
than my mother?’, as one young woman in Juba put it. Educated girls are expected to 
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receive a higher bride-wealth, because parents include their school fees in the total 
amount, and this further links bride-wealth with the social status of the girl herself. 
And the need for parental approval runs deep. One young man in Juba told the story 
of an elderly Equatorian ex-politician who made so many demands of his daughter’s 
fiancé that the couple ran out of patience and moved in together; her subsequent death 
was widely thought to be the result of the ongoing rift with her father. Though the 
young man told the story partly to criticize the greedy father, he also emphasized the 
danger of marriages lacking parental blessing. 
 
  But while bride-wealth remains a means of exclusion or delay, on the other hand 
many young men, and some young women, see marriage as another form of capture. 
The very responsibility that brings status also imposes limits, restricting them – or at 
least their resources – to a new home sphere and making study and travel more 
difficult.
44
 Recently married young men typically have limited resources, having paid 
all their cattle or money as bride-wealth, and/or having committed themselves to 
providing for their new in-laws. Back in the 1940s, the increasing bride-wealth 
amounts in Yei District were being explained by chiefs in relation to increased labour 
migration: ‘parents-in-law expect their sons-in-law to work in their cultivations, 
and… if they are in work elsewhere must demand a higher bride price to compensate 
for the loss of their service’.45 Nowadays men earning wages in NGOs or other 
employment complain about the incessant demands for support from their in-laws. 
Some youth thus resist pressure from relatives to marry, delaying it in favour of 
education or career. They have not been driven into military violence or waged 
employment simply by the need for independent means of marriage. The acquisition 
of knowledge, experience and resources in the wider world and sphere of ‘hakuma’ 
has long been an important role and aspiration of youth; simply remaining ‘at home’ 
has rarely been satisfying. 
 
 
Avoiding capture 
 
  Since the peace was signed in January 2005, the opportunities for youth to enter 
‘hakuma’ have expanded, and yet at the same time many youth have become more 
determined to avoid being ‘captured’ by it. In the aftermath of war, the absence of a 
youthful revolution has become apparent – though some are increasingly adopting 
political definitions of youth – yet youth are often more concerned with retaining their 
independence than with overcoming marginalization, a reflection of their inherently 
in-between position. This becomes particularly apparent when comparisons are drawn 
between youth who are seen to have been incorporated into the ‘hakuma’ and those 
who remain outside or in-between. Soldiers are the most obviously incorporated, 
especially soldiers who assert their superior status over civilians. In the course of our 
research, a commander at a ‘youth’ party in Yei voiced the common accusation that 
civilians are cowards and should all become soldiers, the type of claim that civilians 
unsurprisingly resent. They retort by mocking the perceived stupidity, arrogance and 
greed of commanders and by emphasizing their own role in the ‘struggle’. But they 
also argue that it can be a ‘waste’ for youth to join the army. There were heated 
arguments among a group of young University of Juba graduates in Central Equatoria 
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when some of them enlisted in the 2005 SPLA training in Yei. Their former student 
colleagues argued that incorporation into the military restricts free-thinking, that it 
truly ‘captures’ people. There is awareness that gaining any status within the military 
tends to be arbitrary and dependent on the hierarchies and patronage of the army 
command. But being junior in the army does not quite equate to being ‘youth’, 
because even a junior soldier is seen to have been incorporated into the ‘hakuma’. 
 
  In fact a growing resentment is reported among junior soldiers as well as civilian 
youth regarding the monopolization of the profits of war (and peace) by senior 
officers. The word ‘liberation’ is increasingly used with bitter irony in reference to 
senior officers ‘liberating’ land, resources and even women from their rightful 
owners. ‘It is the commanders who liberated themselves – from poverty!’ as one 
young NGO employee from Yei put it. Since the peace agreement in January 2005, a 
largely older generation of political and predominantly military leaders have been 
installed in the new Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), which is already widely 
perceived as corrupt. The graduates who joined the SPLA in 2005, among others, not 
surprisingly argued that military rank was essential to any future political career. But 
many other literate young people wish to distance themselves altogether from the 
government and politics. One young Equatorian man, for example, was under 
pressure to enter government through the patronage of his relative, a GoSS Minister, 
but resisted because of the dependency and constraints of such a situation. Another 
refused to enter the Lakes State Government because he believed gaining office 
would make him too vulnerable to ‘pressures’, and that it was better to remain 
‘independent’. As another Rumbek youth asserted, ‘politics is a dirty game; you 
cannot involve yourself before you grow, while you don’t know anything there’. 
Some claim to be biding their time rather than risk being contaminated by association 
with a corrupt and perhaps doomed administration. Thus junior members of 
government may describe themselves as ‘youth’ in the political arena, but are seen by 
youth outside government as having lost the independence and freedom of speech 
vital to this category: a distinction partly comparable with Burgess’ account of ‘client’ 
youth in Zanzibari revolutionary politics.
46
 
 
  ‘This Government is making us all want to leave the country and go outside’. Many 
youth hope for education or employment abroad in order to advance their status 
without being captured by ‘hakuma’. With the influx of international organizations, 
the possibilities of employment for literate young people have also expanded within 
Southern Sudan. However, education and employment have rarely brought 
straightforward independence. Access to the former has often, like military 
recruitment, depended on family considerations and resources, or on winning the 
patronage of foreigners and organizations;
47
 there is an increasing gap between the 
aspirations of young people in the ‘liberated’ Southern Sudan, and their capacity to 
achieve them. ‘The big men have sent their children abroad’, complained one young 
man in Rumbek: ‘it is we who are drying up here’. It is such grievances that generate 
the greatest frustration among youth, the results of which are perhaps yet to be seen. 
But their moral criticisms are so far not directed at the older generations (as Abbink 
has suggested) at home, but at the hakuma.
48
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‘Start sweeping from your own tukl’ 
 
  At the same time as revealing their struggle to participate in the wider world or in the 
‘hakuma’ without being entirely incorporated, youth informants also demonstrate 
their in-between role through their investment in ‘home’. Even if they have ambition 
to succeed in the government sphere, they believe that this must be built on support 
from relatives and home community. Even if they view the village with amused and 
critical condescension from the vantage point of their education and experience, they 
nevertheless ensure that they are visibly seen to redistribute their income to relatives 
and villagers. For nothing is guaranteed in the unpredictable sphere of the ‘hakuma’: 
no one knows when they may be thrust back upon the support of their families and 
networks of kinship and locality. As one English-speaking young man put it, if you 
want to succeed in politics and government, ‘you have to start sweeping from your 
own tukl (hut) first’, i.e. build up a support base at home before venturing beyond it. 
Youth place great value on their reputation and in particular on demonstrating 
‘responsibility’ [masulia (Arabic), nyintit (Dinka)]. There is a sense that within the 
home community, their characters are assessed from a young age; this is the social 
arena in which individual recognition and advancement can be achieved. Junior and 
senior status is relative and changing, especially in Rumbek society, so that, for 
example, a young unmarried literate man living in town without employment can still 
be the ‘responsible’ person to pursue a court case regarding the marriage of his 
uncle’s daughter. Roles and relations within families often seem to override wider 
age-based or political categories of youth. 
 
  Many youth have also been investing in the values and history of their rural 
communities, in antithesis to the perceived atrocities and failures of the 
military/government. Young men and women frequently tell family stories with pride, 
from accounts of miraculous feats by prominent relatives, to debates as to which 
grandfather’s grave is the most powerful site from which to curse. In fact in 
discussing the wartime, they are more likely to recount the feats of their rain chiefs, 
spear-masters or other spiritual leaders, than the victories of military commanders. 
Sometimes they recall ritual sacrifices that helped the military, but more often they 
describe morally-sanctioned supernatural powers that protected people from the 
immoral behaviour of soldiers – a repeated assertion of the moral power of the home 
sphere to withstand the force of the ‘hakuma’.49 
 
  Youth also explicitly present themselves as the guardians of the home sphere. In 
Central Equatoria, even youth living in town or working further afield see themselves 
as defenders of land in their home areas and have united with rural elders to complain 
about recent land sales by chiefs or administrators. Some youth, here and elsewhere, 
also see themselves as defending their local cultures against a potentially 
homogenizing government.
50
 In the cattle-keeping areas, where many youth never 
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venture towards the town unless to take cattle to the market, the cattle camps are 
upheld as a more traditional way of life. Songs are central to discussing culture and 
upholding cattle as the currency of value. Town and government are seen not to 
understand the true value of cattle, nor the need for youth violence to defend them. 
The facial scarification of boys at initiation ceremonies has been banned by the SPLM 
and is frowned on by the town/literate people, which only adds to the perception 
among scarified youth in the camps that they are defenders of true local values.
51
 
 
 
Between two worlds 
 
  Youth are not the only ones to operate in both ‘hakuma’ and home spheres 
simultaneously. Chiefs in Central Equatoria and Lakes have not, like Giblin’s 
Tanzanian chiefs, been situated firmly in the government sphere, to the detriment of 
their popularity.
52
 Instead, they have been the primary shield or gatekeepers to their 
communities; those who are remembered as the greatest chiefs are those who are seen 
to have stood up to ‘hakuma’ and kept it at bay. In order to perform this role 
effectively, they had to have the necessary abilities to operate in the government 
sphere – in many cases the chiefs appointed in the colonial period were younger men 
with some knowledge of Arabic and later English – and the position remains a 
compromise between the values of the home sphere and the requirements of 
government work.
53
 
 
  People have come by-and-large to understand the dualism of the role of chiefs. But it 
remains a delicate balancing-act. A chief who shifts his centre of gravity too far into 
the sphere of ‘hakuma’ loses status in the home community, as has happened 
especially with some of the educated chiefs in Juba or more militarized chiefs around 
Yei. One interesting example is an elderly town magistrate, who is the son of a 
famous local chief. In an interview he emphasized his knowledge of ‘international 
law’ and foreign languages, and also described his rain-making abilities, and his brief 
wartime village chiefship. He was however removed from this chiefship by his 
village, and an elderly woman relative of his dismissed ‘that boy’ as belonging to the 
‘town’, big-mouthed and greedy for money.54 Of course elderly people can always 
refer to younger elders as ‘boys’, but her use of the word seemed to emphasize more 
his pandering to government/town people and his lack of status in the village. So in 
seeking to earn status in two worlds, he seems to have instead slipped into the gap 
between, retaining a kind of permanent liminal “youth” status from the perspective of 
the home sphere.  
 
  The beating of chiefs by soldiers referred to at the beginning of this article should 
perhaps be read less as a generational attack then than as a brutal demonstration of the 
role of chiefs as gatekeepers against the attempted incursion of the ‘hakuma’ into the 
home areas. The task of both chiefs and youth is to extract the necessary resources 
from each sphere without being entirely incorporated into it or bringing unwelcome 
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things from one to the other. This is a complicated and shifting task: the space 
between the spheres in a sense does not exist, because most people to some degree 
inhabit both; the boundary is highly permeable, and continually contested. It is being 
particularly debated around Rumbek, where post-1997 sectional violence between 
youth in the cattle camps has generated a mutual blame-game between communities 
and ‘hakuma’. From the perspective of the town and the government, this youth 
violence is a symptom of the backwardness of the cattle camps and the erosion of 
community authority by traumatized youth. But from the community perspective, it is 
the consequence of the introduction of guns – previously located firmly in the 
government sphere – into rural communities, together with the involvement of certain 
SPLM/A officers, which has transformed the nature of local conflicts and undermined 
authorities and mechanisms for resolving them. As one woman explained, in the past 
an ordinary person would never be seen carrying a gun, because there used to be a 
difference between ‘government’ and ‘people’. 
 
  The boundary between ‘hakuma’ and home spheres is also tested in debates about 
the neo-patrimonialism and corruption of government, something that has gained new 
significance in recent years due to expectations about donor and oil money. Neo-
patrimonialism has been defined as an extension of household relations to a wider 
social and political field, but as others have argued, it distorts the character of those 
relations from mutual reciprocity to unequal and profiteering relations of power.
55
 
Officials and the educated are seen to ‘trick’ ordinary people in order to keep 
resources to themselves and their close relatives, and to neglect the wider networks of 
kinship and obligation which are so central to home community relations. While more 
educated youth criticize nepotism and ‘tribalism’ in the westernized language of 
democracy and emphasize their own exclusion, rural youth criticize politicians and 
administrators for rewarding only their closest relatives and not the rest of the village. 
In a sense this partial or distorted importation of home sphere relations into the 
‘hakuma’ is the equivalent of the import of guns in the other direction, or the claim of 
a town magistrate to be a village chief. However much individuals cross back and 
forth between town and village, government and community, these spheres remain 
mutually excluding because of the difficulty – and undesirability – of converting the 
different social and moral relations operating in each sphere. Those who import guns 
or the ways of the ‘hakuma’ may find themselves retaining an immature status – a 
kind of permanent youth – unless they can also invest effectively in the norms and 
relations of family and village. Often, ex-Anyanya soldiers or government employees 
explain that they returned ‘home’ in the 1970s or 80s in recognition of this. One 
Rumbek man, for example, who had been sent into the Anyanya movement by his 
father and afterwards became a policeman, was called home when he became the 
most senior and ‘responsible’ person in his family – a commonly repeated pattern.56 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  Social and political (rather than biological age) definitions of youth have been 
crucial to understanding the enlarged significance of this category in Africa. But the 
danger of explaining all youth mobilization for violence in terms of an African youth 
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crisis is not only that it ignores the specific local reasons for resentment and rebellion, 
but also that it detaches ‘youth’ from their families and communities by treating them 
as a distinct marginalized entity. It is possible to see an emerging definition of youth 
within the sphere of ‘hakuma’ in Southern Sudan which is political rather than 
traditionally age-based or dependent on marital status. But this article has 
characterized youth during and since the SPLA war primarily by their struggle to 
avoid or mitigate government capture at the same time as investing in ‘home’ and 
retaining the ability to operate independently ‘in-between’. Of course armed conflict, 
massive displacement and economic hardship have strained social relations. Young 
people have been caught between the curse and the gun, trying to avoid or balance the 
attempts by both family elders and the ‘hakuma’ to capture them and their resources, 
and to manage the structural tensions of operating between the two.  But the room for 
dialogue and debate contained in the predominately oral culture of local communities 
has helped people to adjust and adapt, so that family has remained – as O’Brien 
somewhat tentatively suggests for West Africa – ‘the most durable of political 
institutions’ in the context of civil war.57  
 
  The war was not fought by youth to force a generational transition, though some of 
its leaders may have been fighting to advance themselves within the government 
sphere. Informants suggest that Southern Sudanese youth were drawn into armed 
conflict largely through capture or to protect themselves and their communities 
against the military. And while young boys who were captured as ‘easily manipulated 
victims’58 may have transferred their loyalties to their gun and military commanders, 
this has not been a total or permanent capture of the youth. Mass demobilization has 
not yet occurred, but the example of Liberia suggests that reintegration may be 
smoother in rural areas where communities understood that youth joined rebel forces 
to protect ‘self and family’.59 Despite the negative depictions being made of 
traumatized young generations, the many years of war have not eradicated, and have 
perhaps contributed to, a moral continuity as evidenced in the deeper aspiration of 
many youth to become ‘responsible’. Even as they have gone out to seek resources 
through education and employment, they have continued to invest in the relations of 
the home sphere, because the latter have proved more reliable, and because they are 
governed by a morality to which youth continue to subscribe. Governments and rebel 
movements have ultimately failed to inculcate an alternative morality or deeper 
ideology, and remain associated in the minds of young and older informants alike 
with the immoralities of guns and money and the one-way patrimonial relations of the 
‘hakuma’. 
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